Re: BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 23, 2006, landfilling BSE/TSE not a good idea, no matter what age. ... Options

[flounder]

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

> The calf was appropriately disposed of in a local
> landfill and did not enter the human or animal food chain.


well, back at the ranch with larry, curly and mo heading up the USDA et al,
what would you expect, nothing less than shoot, shovel and shut the hell up.
no mad cow in USA, feed ban working, no civil war in Iraq either.


but what has past history shown us, evidently it has shown the USDA et al
nothing ;


Disposal of meat and bone meal (MBM) derived from specified risk material
(SRM) and over thirty month scheme carcasses by landfill
The Committee was asked to consider a quantitative risk assessment of the
disposal of meat and bone meal derived from specified risk material and over
thirty month scheme carcasses by landfill, prepared in response to a request
from the Committee at its June 1999 meeting.

The Committee was asked whether, in the light of the results of the risk
assessment, it held to its earlier published (June 1999) view that landfill
was an acceptable outlet for MBM of any origin, although it retained a
preference for incineration. The Committee reiterated that it had a strong
preference for incineration as the favoured route for the disposal of MBM
and were uneasy about the use of landfill for the disposal of this material.
If there were cases where incineration was not practical the Committee felt
it would be preferable for any material going to landfill to be
pressure-cooked first or possibly stored above ground prior to incineration.

http://www.seac.gov.uk/summaries/summ_0700.htm


Disposal of BSE suspect carcases
It is the Department's policy to dispose of BSE suspects by incineration
wherever feasible. No BSE suspect carcases have been landfilled since 1991.

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/public...ation.html#disp


OPINION ON

THE USE OF BURIAL FOR DEALING WITH ANIMAL

CARCASSES AND OTHER ANIMAL MATERIALS THAT

MIGHT CONTAIN BSE/TSE

ADOPTED BY THE

SCIENTIFIC STEERING COMMITTEE

MEETING OF 16-17 JANUARY 2003

The details of the SSC’s evaluation are provided in the attached report. The
SSC

concludes as follows:

(1) The term “burial” includes a diversity of disposal conditions. Although
burial is

widely used for disposal of waste the degradation process essential for
BSE/TSE

infectivity reduction is very difficult to control. The extent to which such
an

infectivity reduction can occur as a consequence of burial is poorly
characterised.

It would appear to be a slow process in various circumstances.

(2) A number of concerns have been identified including potential for
groundwater

contamination, dispersal/transmission by birds/animals/insects, accidental

uncovering by man.

(3) In the absence of any new data the SSC confirms its previous opinion
that animal

material which could possibly be contaminated with BSE/TSEs, burial poses a

risk except under highly controlled conditions (e.g., controlled landfill).

SNIP...

4. CONCLUSION

In the absence of new evidence the opinion of the SSC “Opinion on Fallen
Stock”

(SSC 25th June 1999) must be endorsed strongly that land burial of all
animals and

material derived from them for which there is a possibility that they could

incorporate BSE/TSEs poses a significant risk. Only in exceptional
circumstances

where there could be a considerable delay in implementing a safe means of
disposal

should burial of such materials be considered. Guidelines should be made
available

to aid on burial site selection.

4 PAGES;

http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out309_en.pdf


During the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the UK, the

Department of Health prepared a rapid qualitative

assessment of the potential risks to human health

associated with various methods of carcass disposal

(UK Department of Health, 2001c). The most

relevant hazards to human health resulting from

burial were identified as bacteria pathogenic to

humans, water-borne protozoa, and BSE. The main

potential route identified was contaminated water

supplies, and the report generally concluded that an

engineered licensed landfill would always be

preferable to unlined burial. In general terms, the

findings of the qualitative assessment relative to

biological agents are summarized in Table 13.

TABLE 13. Potential health hazards and associated pathways of exposure
resulting from landfill or burial of

animal carcasses (adapted from UK Department of Health, 2001c).

PLEASE SEE TABLE AT;

http://www.k-state.edu/projects/fss/resear...pfiles/PDF%20Fi
les/CH%201%20-%20Burial.pdf


PART 2

Rendering and fixed-facility incineration were

preferred, but the necessary resources were not

immediately available and UK officials soon learned

that the capacity would only cover a portion of the

disposal needs. Disposal in commercial landfills was

seen as the next best environmental solution, but

legal, commercial, and local community problems

limited landfill use. With these limitations in mind,

pyre burning was the actual initial method used but

was subsequently discontinued following increasing

public, scientific, and political concerns. Mass burial

and on-farm burial were last on the preferred

method list due to the complicating matter of bovine

spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and the risk posed

to groundwater (Hickman & Hughes, 2002).


http://www.k-state.edu/projects/fss/resear...pfiles/PDF%20Fi
les/Introduction%20to%20Part%202%20-%20Cross-Cutting%20&%20Policy%20Issues.pdf



Carcase disposal:

A Major Problem of the

2001 FMD Outbreak

Gordon Hickman and Neil Hughes, Disposal Cell,

FMD Joint Co-ordination Centre, Page Street

snip...


http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/svj/fmd/pages27-40.pdf


3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach
was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed
the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought
this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_...

snip...


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf


PAUL BROWN SCRAPIE SOIL TEST


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/sc/seac07/tab03.pdf



Some unofficial information from a source on the inside looking out -

Confidential!!!!

As early as 1992-3 there had been long studies conducted on small
pastures containing scrapie infected sheep at the sheep research station
associated with the Neuropathogenesis Unit in Edinburgh, Scotland.
Whether these are documented...I don't know. But personal recounts both
heard and recorded in a daily journal indicate that leaving the pastures
free and replacing the topsoil completely at least 2 feet of thickness
each year for SEVEN years....and then when very clean (proven scrapie
free) sheep were placed on these small pastures.... the new sheep also
broke out with scrapie and passed it to offspring. I am not sure that TSE
contaminated ground could ever be free of the agent!!
A very frightening revelation!!!

----------

You can take that with however many grains of salt you wish, and
we can debate these issues all day long, but the bottom line,
this is not rocket-science, all one has to do is some
experiments and case studies. But for the life of me,
I don't know what they are waiting on?

Kind regards,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Bacliff, Texas USA

More here:

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s018.pdf


INCINERATION TEMPS

Requirements include:

a. after burning to the range of 800 to 1000*C to eliminate smell;

well heck, this is just typical public relations fear factor control.
do you actually think they would spend the extra costs for fuel,
for such extreme heat, just to eliminate smell, when they spread
manure all over your veg's. i think not. what they really meant were
any _TSE agents_.

b. Gas scrubbing to eliminate smoke -- though steam may be omitted;

c. Stacks to be fitted with grit arreaters;

snip...

1.2 Visual Imact

It is considered that the requirement for any carcase incinerator
disign would be to ensure that the operations relating to the reception,
storage and decepitation of diseased carcasses must not be publicly
visible and that any part of a carcase could not be removed or
interfered with by animals or birds.

full text;


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1989/04/03006001.pdf


http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out311_en.pdf


TSS


----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder9@VERIZON.NET>
To: <BSE-L@aegee.org>
Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2006 4:39 PM
Subject: BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 23, 2006


> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#####################
>
> Epidemiology Update March 23, 2006
> As of today, 13 locations and 32 movements of cattle have been examined
with
> 27 of those being substantially completed. Additional investigations of
> locations and herds will continue. In addition, state and federal
officials
> have confirmed that a black bull calf was born in 2005 to the index animal
> (the red cow). The calf was taken by the owner to a local stockyard in
July
> 2005 where the calf died. The calf was appropriately disposed of in a
local
> landfill and did not enter the human or animal food chain.
>
>
>
> http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_iss...pi-update.shtml
>
>
> TSS
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder9@VERIZON.NET>
> To: <BSE-L@aegee.org>
> Sent: Sunday, March 19, 2006 3:33 PM
> Subject: BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 17, 2006
>
>
> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> #####################
>
> CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD
> TSS
> BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 17, 2006
> Sun Mar 19, 2006 15:29
> 70.110.86.250
>
>
>
> BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 17, 2006
>
> MONTGOMERY - Alabama Agriculture & Industries Commissioner Ron Sparks,
State
> Veterinarian Dr. Tony Frazier, and Dr. Ken Angel with the USDA held a
press
> conference today to answer questions about yesterday's exhumation of the
> remains of the cow that tested positive for BSE.
>
>
> Federal and state agriculture workers excavated the remains of the animal,
> which had been buried on the farm and did not enter the animal or human
food
> chain, in accordance with USDA protocols. The carcass was that of a red
> crossbred beef type cow. An examination of the cow's teeth confirmed that
> the animal was at least 10 years of age. Samples were taken of the animal
> and the remaining carcass was transported to one of the department's
> diagnostic labs for proper disposal. State and Federal staff are
continuing
> the traceback to determine the herd of origin.
>
> One calf was identified by the owner as belonging to the red cow. The calf
> is approximately 6 weeks old and appeared to be a healthy animal. The calf
> was transported to a USDA lab where DNA from the calf will be compared to
> that of the red cow to confirm relation. If confirmed, this would be the
> first offspring of a BSE diagnosed cow in the United States. Officials
today
> learned that in early 2005 the BSE-positive cow gave birth to another
black
> bull calf. This animal is in the process of being traced.
>
> The cow was first examined by a local veterinarian in late February 2006.
> After the animal failed to respond to medical attention, it was humanely
> euthanized. The cattle producer buried the cow at the farm because Alabama
> Department of Agriculture & Industries regulations require burial of
> livestock within 24 hours. The producer did not suspect that the cow had
> BSE. The local veterinarian sent samples of the cow to the Alabama
> Department of Agriculture & Industries lab
> system, which was then forwarded to the USDA lab in Athens, GA as part of
> the routine voluntary surveillance program for BSE testing. After the
rapid
> test for BSE gave an inconclusive result, the samples were sent to Ames,
> Iowa for a Western Blot test, which gave a positive result. A third test,
> the immunohistochemistry (IHC) test, was performed this week and also
> returned positive results for BSE.
>
> The Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries and the USDA have
been
> encouraging participation in Premises ID Registration as an important step
> in controlling animal disease. Since starting the program in 2005, over
> 2,000 premises have been registered in Alabama. For more information on
> Premises ID Registration call 334-240-7253
>
> http://www.agi.state.al.us/press_releases/bse-update
>
> http://www.agi.state.al.us/press_releases/bse-update?pn=2
>
>
>
> ITEM 6 – BARB CASE CLUSTERS
>
> 39. Professor John Wilesmith (Defra) updated the committee on the
>
> BSE cases born after the 1996 reinforced mammalian meat and
>
> bone meal ban in the UK (BARB cases). Around 116 BARB cases
>
> had been identified in Great Britain up to 22 November 2005,
>
> mostly through active surveillance. BARB cases had decreased in
>
> successive birth cohorts, from 44 in the 1996/1997 cohort to none
>
> to date in the 2000/2001 cohort. However, 3 BARB cases had
>
> been identified in the 2001/2002 cohort. Backcalculation of the
>
> prevalence of BARB cases indicated a drop from 130 infected
>
> animals per million (95% confidence interval 90-190) in the
>
> 1996/1997 cohort to 30 infected animals per million (95%
>
> confidence interval 10-60) in the 1999/2000 cohort. A shift in the
>
> geographical distribution of BSE cases, from the concentration of
>
> pre-1996 BSE cases in Eastern England to a more uniform
>
> 14
>
> © SEAC 2005
>
> distribution of BARB cases, had occurred. However, it appeared
>
> that certain post-1996 cohorts had a higher exposure to BSE in
>
> certain areas for limited periods. Several clusters of BARB cases
>
> within herds had been identified (5 pairs, 2 triplets and 1
>
> quadruplet).
>
> 40. A triplet of BARB cases in South West Wales had been
>
> investigated in detail. The triplet comprised 2 cases born in
>
> September and October 2001 and a third in May 2002. The
>
> animals born in 2001 were reared outdoors from the spring of 2002
>
> but the animal born in 2002 had been reared indoors. Further
>
> investigation of feeding practices revealed that a new feed bin for
>
> the adult dairy herd had been installed in September 1998. In July
>
> 2002 the feed bin was emptied, but not cleaned, and relocated. All
>
> 3 BARB cases received feed from the relocated bin. This finding
>
> suggested the hypothesis that the feed bin installed in September
>
> 1998 was filled initially with contaminated feed, that remnants of
>
> this feed fell to the bottom of the bin during its relocation, and thus
>
> young animals in the 2001/2002 birth cohort were exposed to
>
> feedstuffs produced in 1998. No adult cattle had been infected
>
> because of the reduced susceptibility to BSE with increasing age.
>
> 41. Further investigation of multiple case herds had found no
>
> association of BARB clusters with the closure of feed mills.
>
> 42. Professor Wilesmith concluded that there is evidence of a decline
>
> in risk of infection for successive birth cohorts of cattle. The BARB
>
> epidemic is unlikely to be sustained by animals born after 31 July
>
> 2000. Feed bins could represent a continued source of occasional
>
> infection and advice to farmers is being formulated to reduce this
>
> risk. There is no evidence for an indigenous source of infection for
>
> the BARB cases.
>
> 43. Members considered it encouraging that no other factor, apart from
>
> feed contamination, had been identified as a possible cause of
>
> BARB cases to date. Members commented that this study
>
> suggests that only a small amount of contaminated feed may be
>
> required for infection and that BSE infectivity can survive in the
>
> environment for several years. Professor Wilesmith agreed and
>
> noted that infection caused by small doses of infectious material
>
> was consistent with other studies, and it would appear there is little
>
> dilution of infectivity, if present, in the rendering system.
>
> Additionally it appeared that the infectious agent had survived for 4
>
> years in the feed bin.
>
> 44. The Chair thanked Professor Wilesmith for his presentation.
>
>
>
> snip...
>
>
>
> http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/final90.pdf
>
>
> TSS
>
> #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html
> ####################
>
> #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html
####################
>

#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################

Attached File(s)

 HUMAN_and_ANIMAL_TSE_Classifications_i.e._mad_cow_disease_and_the_UKBSEnvCJD_only_theory.doc ( 187.5K ) Number of downloads: 124

 

[flounder]

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

Medical Waste and CJD 2003 guidelines CDC ?
Mon May 1, 2006 16:56
71.248.145.247


Managing Fluid Disposal
Part I of II
By Kathy Dix

Operating room (OR) personnel are frequently overwhelmed by their numerous responsibilities of not only “fixing” the patient, but also preventing infection, maintaining a sterile field, utilizing only sterile instruments, and in general, ensuring the patient’s safety, as well as that of the OR staff. Proper fluid management is one of those crucial steps to preserving the wellbeing of both staff and patient.

Has your OR personnel been trained in the disposal of liquid waste? Are they aware of state and/or city regulations? Is their bloodborne pathogen training recent? Is annual competency testing required?



snip...



Of special interest, APIC’s guidelines also point out the more recent anxiety related to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). “Concerns also have been raised about the need for special handling and treatment procedures for wastes generated during the care of patients with CJD or other transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs),” the guidelines observe. “Prions, the agents that cause TSEs, have significant resistance to inactivation by a variety of physical, chemical, or gaseous methods. No epidemiologic evidence, however, links acquisition of CJD with medical-waste disposal practices. Although handling neurologic tissue for pathologic examination and autopsy materials with care, using barrier precautions, and following specific procedures for the autopsy are prudent measures, employing extraordinary measures once the materials are discarded is unnecessary. Regulated medical wastes generated during the care of the CJD patient can be managed using the same strategies as wastes generated during the care of other patients. After decontamination, these wastes may then be disposed in a sanitary landfill or discharged to the sanitary sewer, as appropriate.”1



http://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/articles/651feat3.html



Guidelines for Environmental Infection Control

in Health-Care Facilities

Recommendations of CDC and the Healthcare Infection Control

Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC)

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

Atlanta, GA 30333

2003



snip...

6. Medical Waste and CJD

Concerns also have been raised about the need for special handling and treatment procedures for wastes

generated during the care of patients with CJD or other transmissible spongiform encephalopathies

(TSEs). Prions, the agents that cause TSEs, have significant resistance to inactivation by a variety of

physical, chemical, or gaseous methods.1427 No epidemiologic evidence, however, links acquisition of

CJD with medical-waste disposal practices. Although handling neurologic tissue for pathologic

examination and autopsy materials with care, using barrier precautions, and following specific

117

procedures for the autopsy are prudent measures,1197 employing extraordinary measures once the

materials are discarded is unnecessary. Regulated medical wastes generated during the care of the CJD

patient can be managed using the same strategies as wastes generated during the care of other patients.

After decontamination, these wastes may then be disposed in a sanitary landfill or discharged to the

sanitary sewer, as appropriate. .........



snip...



http://www.apic.org/AM/Template.cfm?Sectio...ntentFileID=342



VARIANT CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE (vCJD) and BLOOD

COMPONENTS

INFORMATION FOR PATIENTS, February 2006



http://www.hpa.org.uk/infections/topics_az...BC-InfoforP.pdf



http://www.hpa.org.uk/infections/topics_az...ex1-Aug2005.pdf



© 2006 American Society for Investigative Pathology

Detection and Localization of PrPSc in the Skeletal Muscle of Patients with Variant, Iatrogenic, and Sporadic Forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Alexander H. Peden, Diane L. Ritchie, Mark W. Head and James W. Ironside
From the National Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance Unit and Division of Pathology, School of Molecular and Clinical Medicine, University of Edinburgh, Western General Hospital, Edinburgh, United Kingdom


Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) differs from other human prion diseases in that the pathogenic prion protein PrPSc can be detected to a greater extent at extraneuronal sites throughout the body, principally within lymphoid tissues. However, a recent study using a high-sensitivity Western blotting technique revealed low levels of PrPSc in skeletal muscle from a quarter of Swiss patients with sporadic CJD (sCJD). This posed the question of whether PrPSc in muscle could also be detected in vCJD, sCJD, and iatrogenic (iCJD) patients from other populations. Therefore, we have used the same high-sensitivity Western blotting technique, in combination with paraffin-embedded tissue blotting, to screen for PrPSc in muscle tissue specimens taken at autopsy from 49 CJD patients in the United Kingdom. These techniques identified muscle PrPSc in 8 of 17 vCJD, 7 of 26 sCJD, and 2 of 5 iCJD patients. Paraffin-embedded tissue blotting analysis showed PrPSc in skeletal muscle in localized anatomical structures that had the morphological and immunohistochemical characteristics of nerve fibers. The detection of PrPSc in muscle tissue from all forms of CJD indicates the possible presence of infectivity in these tissues, suggesting important implications for assessing the potential risk of iatrogenic spread via contaminated surgical instruments.



http://ajp.amjpathol.org/cgi/content/abstract/168/3/927


SEAC 2006



21. Dr Matthews noted that data are now available on the infectivity of

a wide range of bovine tissues. In September 2005, the World

Health Organisation had updated its assessment of the risk of TSE

infectivity in tissues. These data, although incomplete, should

increase confidence in the safety of particular tissues, particularly if

the age of the source animal is also considered. As a result, less

reliance need now be placed on the status of the country of origin.

Members agreed, but noted that it would be important to assess

the quality of the data on which assessments are based. As it

seems highly likely that blood, at least from humans infected with

vCJD, can be infectious, tissues and organs with a significant

blood supply may also confer higher risk.



http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/draft-91.pdf



THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK FACTORS FOR TSE ARE STILL UNKNOWN, but from recent science coming out lately, the risk factor seems to be increasing, rather than decreasing.



CAN SOMEONE PLEASE EXPLAIN TO ME WHY IT IS STILL ACCEPTABLE FOR sanitary landfill or discharged to the sanitary sewer, as appropriate FOR CJD, when the epidemiology of all phenotypes of sporadic CJDs are not known to date, and with apparent new ones of 'unknown' origin being documented as we speak???

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/resources-casereport.html



THE practice of landfilling and or the discharging to the sanitary sewer, and or spreading to land as fertilizer of any human and or animal TSE should be banned immediately. ...TSS



TSS

#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

> The calf was appropriately disposed of in a local
> landfill and did not enter the human or animal food chain.
well, back at the ranch with larry, curly and mo heading up the USDA et al,
what would you expect, nothing less than shoot, shovel and shut the hell up.
no mad cow in USA, feed ban working, no civil war in Iraq either.
but what has past history shown us, evidently it has shown the USDA et al
nothing ;
Disposal of meat and bone meal (MBM) derived from specified risk material
(SRM) and over thirty month scheme carcasses by landfill
The Committee was asked to consider a quantitative risk assessment of the
disposal of meat and bone meal derived from specified risk material and over
thirty month scheme carcasses by landfill, prepared in response to a request
from the Committee at its June 1999 meeting.

The Committee was asked whether, in the light of the results of the risk
assessment, it held to its earlier published (June 1999) view that landfill
was an acceptable outlet for MBM of any origin, although it retained a
preference for incineration. The Committee reiterated that it had a strong
preference for incineration as the favoured route for the disposal of MBM
and were uneasy about the use of landfill for the disposal of this material.
If there were cases where incineration was not practical the Committee felt
it would be preferable for any material going to landfill to be
pressure-cooked first or possibly stored above ground prior to incineration.

http://www.seac.gov.uk/summaries/summ_0700.htm
Disposal of BSE suspect carcases
It is the Department's policy to dispose of BSE suspects by incineration
wherever feasible. No BSE suspect carcases have been landfilled since 1991.

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/public...ation.html#disp
OPINION ON

THE USE OF BURIAL FOR DEALING WITH ANIMAL

CARCASSES AND OTHER ANIMAL MATERIALS THAT

MIGHT CONTAIN BSE/TSE

ADOPTED BY THE

SCIENTIFIC STEERING COMMITTEE

MEETING OF 16-17 JANUARY 2003

The details of the SSC’s evaluation are provided in the attached report. The
SSC

concludes as follows:

(1) The term “burial” includes a diversity of disposal conditions. Although
burial is

widely used for disposal of waste the degradation process essential for
BSE/TSE

infectivity reduction is very difficult to control. The extent to which such
an

infectivity reduction can occur as a consequence of burial is poorly
characterised.

It would appear to be a slow process in various circumstances.

(2) A number of concerns have been identified including potential for
groundwater

contamination, dispersal/transmission by birds/animals/insects, accidental

uncovering by man.

(3) In the absence of any new data the SSC confirms its previous opinion
that animal

material which could possibly be contaminated with BSE/TSEs, burial poses a

risk except under highly controlled conditions (e.g., controlled landfill).

SNIP...

4. CONCLUSION

In the absence of new evidence the opinion of the SSC “Opinion on Fallen
Stock”

(SSC 25th June 1999) must be endorsed strongly that land burial of all
animals and

material derived from them for which there is a possibility that they could

incorporate BSE/TSEs poses a significant risk. Only in exceptional
circumstances

where there could be a considerable delay in implementing a safe means of
disposal

should burial of such materials be considered. Guidelines should be made
available

to aid on burial site selection.

4 PAGES;

http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out309_en.pdf
During the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the UK, the

Department of Health prepared a rapid qualitative

assessment of the potential risks to human health

associated with various methods of carcass disposal

(UK Department of Health, 2001c). The most

relevant hazards to human health resulting from

burial were identified as bacteria pathogenic to

humans, water-borne protozoa, and BSE. The main

potential route identified was contaminated water

supplies, and the report generally concluded that an

engineered licensed landfill would always be

preferable to unlined burial. In general terms, the

findings of the qualitative assessment relative to

biological agents are summarized in Table 13.

TABLE 13. Potential health hazards and associated pathways of exposure
resulting from landfill or burial of

animal carcasses (adapted from UK Department of Health, 2001c).

PLEASE SEE TABLE AT;

http://www.k-state.edu/projects/fss/resear...pfiles/PDF%20Fi
les/CH%201%20-%20Burial.pdf
PART 2

Rendering and fixed-facility incineration were

preferred, but the necessary resources were not

immediately available and UK officials soon learned

that the capacity would only cover a portion of the

disposal needs. Disposal in commercial landfills was

seen as the next best environmental solution, but

legal, commercial, and local community problems

limited landfill use. With these limitations in mind,

pyre burning was the actual initial method used but

was subsequently discontinued following increasing

public, scientific, and political concerns. Mass burial

and on-farm burial were last on the preferred

method list due to the complicating matter of bovine

spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and the risk posed

to groundwater (Hickman & Hughes, 2002).
http://www.k-state.edu/projects/fss/resear...pfiles/PDF%20Fi
les/Introduction%20to%20Part%202%20-%20Cross-Cutting%20&%20Policy%20Issues.pdf
Carcase disposal:

A Major Problem of the

2001 FMD Outbreak

Gordon Hickman and Neil Hughes, Disposal Cell,

FMD Joint Co-ordination Centre, Page Street

snip...
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/svj/fmd/pages27-40.pdf
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach
was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed
the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought
this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_...

snip...
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
PAUL BROWN SCRAPIE SOIL TEST
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/sc/seac07/tab03.pdf
Some unofficial information from a source on the inside looking out -

Confidential!!!!

As early as 1992-3 there had been long studies conducted on small
pastures containing scrapie infected sheep at the sheep research station
associated with the Neuropathogenesis Unit in Edinburgh, Scotland.
Whether these are documented...I don't know. But personal recounts both
heard and recorded in a daily journal indicate that leaving the pastures
free and replacing the topsoil completely at least 2 feet of thickness
each year for SEVEN years....and then when very clean (proven scrapie
free) sheep were placed on these small pastures.... the new sheep also
broke out with scrapie and passed it to offspring. I am not sure that TSE
contaminated ground could ever be free of the agent!!
A very frightening revelation!!!

----------

You can take that with however many grains of salt you wish, and
we can debate these issues all day long, but the bottom line,
this is not rocket-science, all one has to do is some
experiments and case studies. But for the life of me,
I don't know what they are waiting on?

Kind regards,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Bacliff, Texas USA

More here:

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s018.pdf
INCINERATION TEMPS

Requirements include:

a. after burning to the range of 800 to 1000*C to eliminate smell;

well heck, this is just typical public relations fear factor control.
do you actually think they would spend the extra costs for fuel,
for such extreme heat, just to eliminate smell, when they spread
manure all over your veg's. i think not. what they really meant were
any _TSE agents_.

b. Gas scrubbing to eliminate smoke -- though steam may be omitted;

c. Stacks to be fitted with grit arreaters;

snip...

1.2 Visual Imact

It is considered that the requirement for any carcase incinerator
disign would be to ensure that the operations relating to the reception,
storage and decepitation of diseased carcasses must not be publicly
visible and that any part of a carcase could not be removed or
interfered with by animals or birds.

full text;
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1989/04/03006001.pdf
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out311_en.pdf
TSS
----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder9@VERIZON.NET>
To: <BSE-L@aegee.org>
Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2006 4:39 PM
Subject: BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 23, 2006
> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#####################
>
> Epidemiology Update March 23, 2006
> As of today, 13 locations and 32 movements of cattle have been examined
with
> 27 of those being substantially completed. Additional investigations of
> locations and herds will continue. In addition, state and federal
officials
> have confirmed that a black bull calf was born in 2005 to the index animal
> (the red cow). The calf was taken by the owner to a local stockyard in
July
> 2005 where the calf died. The calf was appropriately disposed of in a
local
> landfill and did not enter the human or animal food chain.
>
>
>
> http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_iss...pi-update.shtml
>
>
> TSS
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder9@VERIZON.NET>
> To: <BSE-L@aegee.org>
> Sent: Sunday, March 19, 2006 3:33 PM
> Subject: BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 17, 2006
>
>
> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> #####################
>
> CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD
> TSS
> BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 17, 2006
> Sun Mar 19, 2006 15:29
> 70.110.86.250
>
>
>
> BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 17, 2006
>
> MONTGOMERY - Alabama Agriculture & Industries Commissioner Ron Sparks,
State
> Veterinarian Dr. Tony Frazier, and Dr. Ken Angel with the USDA held a
press
> conference today to answer questions about yesterday's exhumation of the
> remains of the cow that tested positive for BSE.
>
>
> Federal and state agriculture workers excavated the remains of the animal,
> which had been buried on the farm and did not enter the animal or human
food
> chain, in accordance with USDA protocols. The carcass was that of a red
> crossbred beef type cow. An examination of the cow's teeth confirmed that
> the animal was at least 10 years of age. Samples were taken of the animal
> and the remaining carcass was transported to one of the department's
> diagnostic labs for proper disposal. State and Federal staff are
continuing
> the traceback to determine the herd of origin.
>
> One calf was identified by the owner as belonging to the red cow. The calf
> is approximately 6 weeks old and appeared to be a healthy animal. The calf
> was transported to a USDA lab where DNA from the calf will be compared to
> that of the red cow to confirm relation. If confirmed, this would be the
> first offspring of a BSE diagnosed cow in the United States. Officials
today
> learned that in early 2005 the BSE-positive cow gave birth to another
black
> bull calf. This animal is in the process of being traced.
>
> The cow was first examined by a local veterinarian in late February 2006.
> After the animal failed to respond to medical attention, it was humanely
> euthanized. The cattle producer buried the cow at the farm because Alabama
> Department of Agriculture & Industries regulations require burial of
> livestock within 24 hours. The producer did not suspect that the cow had
> BSE. The local veterinarian sent samples of the cow to the Alabama
> Department of Agriculture & Industries lab
> system, which was then forwarded to the USDA lab in Athens, GA as part of
> the routine voluntary surveillance program for BSE testing. After the
rapid
> test for BSE gave an inconclusive result, the samples were sent to Ames,
> Iowa for a Western Blot test, which gave a positive result. A third test,
> the immunohistochemistry (IHC) test, was performed this week and also
> returned positive results for BSE.
>
> The Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries and the USDA have
been
> encouraging participation in Premises ID Registration as an important step
> in controlling animal disease. Since starting the program in 2005, over
> 2,000 premises have been registered in Alabama. For more information on
> Premises ID Registration call 334-240-7253
>
> http://www.agi.state.al.us/press_releases/bse-update
>
> http://www.agi.state.al.us/press_releases/bse-update?pn=2
>
>
>
> ITEM 6 – BARB CASE CLUSTERS
>
> 39. Professor John Wilesmith (Defra) updated the committee on the
>
> BSE cases born after the 1996 reinforced mammalian meat and
>
> bone meal ban in the UK (BARB cases). Around 116 BARB cases
>
> had been identified in Great Britain up to 22 November 2005,
>
> mostly through active surveillance. BARB cases had decreased in
>
> successive birth cohorts, from 44 in the 1996/1997 cohort to none
>
> to date in the 2000/2001 cohort. However, 3 BARB cases had
>
> been identified in the 2001/2002 cohort. Backcalculation of the
>
> prevalence of BARB cases indicated a drop from 130 infected
>
> animals per million (95% confidence interval 90-190) in the
>
> 1996/1997 cohort to 30 infected animals per million (95%
>
> confidence interval 10-60) in the 1999/2000 cohort. A shift in the
>
> geographical distribution of BSE cases, from the concentration of
>
> pre-1996 BSE cases in Eastern England to a more uniform
>
> 14
>
> © SEAC 2005
>
> distribution of BARB cases, had occurred. However, it appeared
>
> that certain post-1996 cohorts had a higher exposure to BSE in
>
> certain areas for limited periods. Several clusters of BARB cases
>
> within herds had been identified (5 pairs, 2 triplets and 1
>
> quadruplet).
>
> 40. A triplet of BARB cases in South West Wales had been
>
> investigated in detail. The triplet comprised 2 cases born in
>
> September and October 2001 and a third in May 2002. The
>
> animals born in 2001 were reared outdoors from the spring of 2002
>
> but the animal born in 2002 had been reared indoors. Further
>
> investigation of feeding practices revealed that a new feed bin for
>
> the adult dairy herd had been installed in September 1998. In July
>
> 2002 the feed bin was emptied, but not cleaned, and relocated. All
>
> 3 BARB cases received feed from the relocated bin. This finding
>
> suggested the hypothesis that the feed bin installed in September
>
> 1998 was filled initially with contaminated feed, that remnants of
>
> this feed fell to the bottom of the bin during its relocation, and thus
>
> young animals in the 2001/2002 birth cohort were exposed to
>
> feedstuffs produced in 1998. No adult cattle had been infected
>
> because of the reduced susceptibility to BSE with increasing age.
>
> 41. Further investigation of multiple case herds had found no
>
> association of BARB clusters with the closure of feed mills.
>
> 42. Professor Wilesmith concluded that there is evidence of a decline
>
> in risk of infection for successive birth cohorts of cattle. The BARB
>
> epidemic is unlikely to be sustained by animals born after 31 July
>
> 2000. Feed bins could represent a continued source of occasional
>
> infection and advice to farmers is being formulated to reduce this
>
> risk. There is no evidence for an indigenous source of infection for
>
> the BARB cases.
>
> 43. Members considered it encouraging that no other factor, apart from
>
> feed contamination, had been identified as a possible cause of
>
> BARB cases to date. Members commented that this study
>
> suggests that only a small amount of contaminated feed may be
>
> required for infection and that BSE infectivity can survive in the
>
> environment for several years. Professor Wilesmith agreed and
>
> noted that infection caused by small doses of infectious material
>
> was consistent with other studies, and it would appear there is little
>
> dilution of infectivity, if present, in the rendering system.
>
> Additionally it appeared that the infectious agent had survived for 4
>
> years in the feed bin.
>
> 44. The Chair thanked Professor Wilesmith for his presentation.
>
>
>
> snip...
>
>
>
> http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/final90.pdf
>
>
> TSS
>
> #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html
> ####################
>
> #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html
####################
>

#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################

[flounder]

USDA CONFIRMS BSE Tests on U.S. Cows Found Identical to Atypical Cases in France
Date: June 6, 2006 at 7:22 am PST
BSE Tests on U.S. Cows Found Identical to Atypical Cases in France 06/05/06 07:55

OMAHA (DTN) -- A USDA official confirmed the positive BSE tests in two U.S.-born cattle were indeed an "atypical" type of the disease.

A USDA spokesman acknowledged Friday positive BSE tests from two domestic-born cattle were from a rare strain of the disease found in a small number of European cases.

BSE, scientifically known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy and commonly known as mad cow disease, is a degenerative, fatal disease affecting the central nervous system of adult cattle.

USDA officials have declined in the past to provide such details, but released information Friday after a French researcher revealed earlier this week that the cases in Texas last year and Alabama last spring were identical to "atypical" cases of BSE found in France.

Scientists from around the world are trying to quantify the significance of these rare cases. They also want to know if these cases may be sporadic.

In an e-mail, a USDA spokesman said the cases raise "many unanswered questions about these unusual findings, and additional research is needed to help characterize the significance -- or lack of significance -- of any of these findings."

The USDA spokesperson said nothing in the test results of the two cattle justifies any changes in surveillance, disease control or public-health measures already being taken in the U.S.

http://www.news.farmpage.com/index.cfm?show=4&id=16987

Cattle disease might be unknown strain of BSE
05/06/2006 09:00:00
Farmers Weekly
Scientists across Europe and the United States are following the emergence of a new Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) in cattle that could be a new strain of BSE.

Speaking last weekend at an international conference on prion diseases in domestic livestock (such as BSE in cows and scrapie in sheep and goats) scientists from France and Italy described how the disease had been detected in a small number of cattle ranging from five to 15 years old.

The strain differs from BSE in that it has a longer incubation time and is consequently being found in older cattle.

The new strain also demonstrates different characteristics from BSE in laboratory tests and was originally detected through active surveillance of live animals rather than during inspection of a suspect fallen animal.

Marion Simmons of the Veterinary Laboratory Agency at Weybridge urged caution saying there are not yet sufficient supporting data to suggest that the disease is a new strain of BSE.

http://www.fwi.co.uk/Articles/2006/06/05/9...ain+of+BSE.html

BASE in cattle in Italy of Identification of a second bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy: Molecular similarities with

sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0305777101v1

Singeltary et al

http://www.microbes.info/forums/index.php?...type=post&id=13

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

I thought some might be interested in this ;

Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse

Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

Project Number: 3625-32000-073-07
Project Type: Specific C/A

Start Date: Sep 15, 2004
End Date: Sep 14, 2007

Objective:
The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli
from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct
comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)
isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will
cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used
in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison
of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE
cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical
BSE isolates in cattle and other species.

Approach:
This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the
Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del
Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance
program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for
detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE
isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of
the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain
homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be
critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to
typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis.
If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between
cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate.
Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding
specific risk material (SRM) removal.

http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/...?ACCN_NO=408490

Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse

Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

2005 Annual Report

This report serves to document research conducted under a specific
cooperative agreement between ARS and the Italian Reference Centre for
Animal TSE (CEA) at the Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Turin, Italy.
Additional details of research can be found in then report for the parent
project 3625-32000-073-00D, Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology
of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies. The aim of the cooperative
research project conducted by the CEA and ARS is to compare the U.S. bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the bovine amyloidotic
spongiform encephalopathy isolates (BASE) identified in Italy. The first
objective was to determine whether diagnostic methods routinely used by USDA
are able to identify the Italian BASE cases. For this purpose, CEA received
the immunohistochemistry (IHC) protocol developed by APHIS-USDA. The IHC
protocol was reproduced and standardized in the CEA laboratory and will be
applied to the Italian BSE and BASE cases. Furthermore, fixed brainstem
sections and frozen brainstem material from Italian BSE and BASE cases will
be sent to ARS for analysis using USDA IHC and Western blot (WB) methods.
These studies will enable us to determine whether the present diagnostic
tools (IHC and WB) employed at the USDA will be able to detect the Italian
BASE cases and also enable us to compare Italian BSE and BASE with the U.S.
BSE cases.

http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/...O=408490&showpa
rs=true&fy=2005

Research Project: Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology of
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies

Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock

Title: Where We've Been and Where We're Going with Bse Testing in the United
States

Authors
item Hall, Mark - NVSL-APHIS-USDA
item Richt, Juergen
item Davis, Arthur - NVSL-APHIS-USDA
item Levings, Randall - NVSL-APHIS-USDA

Submitted to: American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians
Publication Type: Abstract
Publication Acceptance Date: September 1, 2005
Publication Date: November 3, 2005
Citation: Hall, M.S., Richt, J.A., Davis, A.J., Levings, R.L. 2005. Where
We've Been and Where We're Going with Bse Testing in the United States
[abstract]. 48th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Veterinary
Laboratory Diagnosticians. P. 20.

Technical Abstract: A review of the laboratory aspects of the United States
Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Surveillance Program from its beginning to the present day will be provided.
Validated diagnostic tests for BSE require brain tissue. There are no ante
mortem (blood/serum) tests for BSE available at present. From a historical
perspective, diagnostic tests for BSE continue to evolve. The original
diagnostic test method was histopathology in which sections of brain were
examined under a microscope, and the classical vacuoles and spongiform
change in specific areas of the brain would allow a diagnosis to be made.
This method was accurate but only allowed a diagnosis to be made relatively
late in the course of the disease. In the mid-1990s, immunohistochemistry
(IHC) and Western blotting were developed which allow the detection of the
abnormal form of the prion protein (PrPSc) and a diagnosis could be made
prior to the development of spongiform changes and clinical signs. In the
past decade, so-called "rapid tests" have been introduced commercially for
BSE. Five commercial tests are currently licensed/permitted in the United
States for BSE. These licensed tests include the Prionics Western blot,
Prionics ELISA, Enfer/Abbott ELISA, IDEXX ELISA, and the BioRad ELISA. This
presentation will discuss various attributes of the validated test methods
available today. Both IHC and Western blot are considered confirmatory tests
for BSE by the World Organisation of Animal Health (OIE). IHC provides for a
specific immunological detection of PrPSc and enables the specific
anatomical location to be determined. Western blot provides both
immunological detection of PrPSc as well as specific molecular weight
characterizations; certain Western blot procedures can be extremely
sensitive due to various concentration procedures before analysis of the
sample. The OIE recommended Western blot and IHC methods for confirmatory
diagnosis of BSE used by USDA and the Veterinary Laboratories Agency in
Weybridge, England, will be discussed. The overall enhanced testing plan
that has been used for the past 18 months will be described including
changes that have occurred during this time. The USDA's BSE enhanced
surveillance plan has been a very successful national surveillance testing
program that has been a shared effort between state veterinary diagnostic
laboratories as part of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network and
the National Veterinary Services Laboratories.

http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publicati...m?SEQ_NO_115=18
3829

NEW STRAIN OF TSE USA CATTLE OR JUST INCOMPETENCE IN TESTING???

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03...03-025IFA-2.pdf

Greetings again,

I was going over the data from the 1st documented BSE/TSE cow
in the USA and find it disturbing USDA thought it important enough
to use WB to verify there immunohistochemistry test then ;

TSEs Touch Off
ARS Research

A year ago this month, a group of ARS
scientists and technicians gave up their Christmas time off and even
delayed family vacations to provide characterization of the first case
of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)-commonly called mad cow
disease-to be found in the United States.

On December 23, 2003, a Canadian cow shipped to slaughter from a farm in
Mabton, Washington, had come up presumptively positive for BSE in
testing by USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS),
which has diagnostic responsibility and regulatory oversight for BSE
issues. APHIS had already used the "gold standard" diagnostic
immunohistochemistry test, which was originally developed by ARS. But
for the first U.S. case of BSE, APHIS wanted additional scientific
information that could be provided by the Western blot test.

So APHIS put in a high-priority call to veterinary medical officer
Juergen Richt and his colleagues at the Virus and Prion Diseases of
Livestock Laboratory, which is part of ARS's National Animal Disease
Center (NADC) in Ames, Iowa.

"We had experience with the Western blot test and we had all the
reagents on hand," explains Richt. "So we put our holiday plans on hold
and got everything ready so that APHIS would have verification of the
results from the immunohistochemistry test." ........... snip

full text;

http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/AR/archive/dec04/tse1204.htm
http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/AR/archive/dec04/

HOWEVER, on the 2nd suspect Texas mad cow, not the stumbling and staggering
one they refused to test at all here ;

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the
weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That
material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as
"mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way
now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule
would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals
(e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison). ...

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html

BUT, i am speaking of the suspect Texas mad cow where tissue samples sat on
the shelf for 7+ months and then it took an act of Congress, thanks to the
Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG, and an end around Johanns, Dehaven et al
to get those samples to Weybridge for confirmation, where it was finally
confirmed ;

The animal was selected for testing because, as a non-ambulatory animal, it
was considered to be at higher risk for BSE. An initial screening test on
the animal in November 2004 was inconclusive, triggering USDA to conduct the
internationally accepted confirmatory IHC tests. Those test results were
negative. Earlier this month, USDA's Office of the Inspector General
recommended further testing of the seven-month-old sample using another
internationally recognized confirmatory test, the Western blot. Unlike the
IHC, the Western blot was reactive, prompting USDA to send samples from the
animal to the Weybridge laboratory for further analysis. ...

Last Modified: 06/24/2005

http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_.../.ar/sa.retriev
econtent/.c/6_2_1UH/.ce/7_2_5JM/.p/5_2_4TQ/.d/1/_th/J_2_9D/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?
PC_7_2_5JM_contentid=2005%2F06%2F0232.xml&PC_7_2_5JM_navtype=RT&PC_7_2_5JM_p
arentnav=LATEST_RELEASES&PC_7_2_5JM_navid=NEWS_RELEASE#7_2_5JM

EVEN more disturbing is the fact that Dr. Detwiler, former top TSE expert at
USDA, tried to tell this Administration this in 2003, and they refused to
listen, this just before she left USDA ;

USDA 2003

We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that
we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten
away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain
stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a
project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did
not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the
cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go
back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA,
we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got
away from it. They've recently gone back.
Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an
'official' test result as recognized by APHIS
.

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't
they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking
only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine
ourselves to one area.

snip.............

Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it.
Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives
do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the
disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important.
If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if
collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you
could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test.
There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We
have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we
forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten
away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain
stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a
project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did
not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the
cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go
back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA,
we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got
away from it. They've recently gone back.

Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an
'official' test result as recognized by APHIS
.

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't
they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking
only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine
ourselves to one area.

snip...

FULL TEXT;

Completely Edited Version
PRION ROUNDTABLE

Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado
====================================================

Taking a Quality Sample

Too Little Tissue Submitted Too Little Tissue Submitted

NOTE: The samples in these photos are suitable for ELISA testing and if
negative by ELISA there would not be a problem, but if the results were
inconclusive then it would be difficult to process for IHC and additional
testing.

August 24, 2004 Taking a Quality Sample: E4

snip...end

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nvsl/BSE/Manual/appendixe.pdf

Getting a Sample of Sufficient Quality
Unless the sample is of sufficient quality, it will be unusable and
not count towards the survey. Please see Appendix E for
guidance on collecting a quality sample. If the sample is not of
sufficient quality, STOP: DO NOT TAKE THE SAMPLE. This
does NOT apply to samples taken from:

. animals that are highly suspicious for BSE or that
involve an FAD investigation

. animals that were condemned in an antemortem
inspection BSE sampling using a spoon

Step 1

. Place head upright

- On head rack or barrel
- On table edge
- On the ground facing down if no other option

snip...

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nvsl/BSE/procedure_manual.pdf

NOW, if we go back further, is this really any surprise ;

>> Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations
>> regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.

snip...end

full text ;

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf

3.57 The experiment which might have determined whether BSE and scrapie were
caused by the same agent (ie, the feeding of natural scrapie to cattle) was
never undertaken in the UK. It was, however, performed in the USA in 1979,
when it was shown that cattle inoculated with the scrapie agent endemic in
the flock of Suffolk sheep at the United States Department of Agriculture in
Mission, Texas, developed a TSE quite unlike BSE. 32 The findings of the
initial transmission, though not of the clinical or neurohistological
examination, were communicated in October 1988 to Dr Watson, Director of the
CVL, following a visit by Dr Wrathall, one of the project leaders in the
Pathology Department of the CVL, to the United States Department of
Agriculture. 33 The results were not published at this point, since the
attempted transmission to mice from the experimental cow brain had been
inconclusive. The results of the clinical and histological differences
between scrapie-affected sheep and cattle were published in 1995. Similar
studies in which cattle were inoculated intracerebrally with scrapie inocula
derived from a number of scrapie-affected sheep of different breeds and from
different States, were carried out at the US National Animal Disease Centre.
34 The results, published in 1994, showed that this source of scrapie agent,
though pathogenic for cattle, did not produce the same clinical signs of
brain lesions characteristic of BSE.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume...tea3.htm#820543

The findings of the initial transmission, though not of the clinical or
neurohistological examination, were communicated in October 1988 to Dr
Watson, Director of the CVL, following a visit by Dr Wrathall, one of the
project leaders in the Pathology Department of the CVL, to the United States
Department of Agriculture. 33

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/10/00001001.pdf

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume...tea3.htm#820546

The results were not published at this point, since the attempted
transmission to mice from the experimental cow brain had been inconclusive.
The results of the clinical and histological differences between
scrapie-affected sheep and cattle were published in 1995. Similar studies in
which cattle were inoculated intracerebrally with scrapie inocula derived
from a number of scrapie-affected sheep of different breeds and from
different States, were carried out at the US National Animal Disease Centre.
34 The
results, published in 1994, showed that this source of scrapie agent, though
pathogenic for cattle, did not produce the same clinical signs of brain
lesions characteristic of BSE.

3.58 There are several possible reasons why the experiment was not performed
in the UK. It had been recommended by Sir Richard Southwood (Chairman of the
Working Party on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) in his letter to the
Permanent Secretary of MAFF, Mr (now Sir) Derek Andrews, on 21 June 1988, 35
though it was not specifically recommended in the Working Party Report or
indeed in the Tyrrell Committee Report (details of the Southwood Working
Party and the Tyrell Committee can be found in vol. 4: The Southwood Working
Party, 1988-89 and vol. 11: Scientists after Southwood respectively). The
direct inoculation of scrapie into calves was given low priority, because of
its high cost and because it was known that it had already taken place in
the USA. 36 It was also felt that the results of such an experiment would be
hard to interpret. While a negative result would be informative, a positive
result would need to demonstrate that when scrapie was transmitted to
cattle, the disease which developed in cattle was the same as BSE. 37 Given
the large number of strains of scrapie and the possibility that BSE was one
of them, it would be necessary to transmit every scrapie strain to cattle
separately, to test the hypothesis properly. Such an experiment would be
expensive. Secondly, as measures to control the epidemic took hold, the need
for the experiment from the policy viewpoint was not considered so urgent.
It was felt that the results would be mainly of academic interest. 38

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume...tea3.htm#820550

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume2/chaptea3.htm

UKBSEnvCJD only theory Singeltary et al 2006

http://www.microbes.info/forums/index.php?...type=post&id=13

http://www.microbes.info/forums/index.php?showtopic=306

CJD WATCH

http://www.fortunecity.com/healthclub/cpr/349/part1cjd.htm

CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD

http://disc.server.com/Indices/167318.html

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To:
Sent: Thursday, June 01, 2006 2:33 PM
Subject: BSE, BOVINE - USA: ATYPICAL STRAIN

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#####################

BSE, BOVINE - USA: ATYPICAL STRAIN
**********************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail, a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases

Date: 31 May 2006
From: Terry S. Singletary and Mary Marshall

Source: Rapid City Journal [edited]

The 2 cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy found in U.S. cattle
over the past year came from a rare strain of BSE found largely in
Europe that scientists are only beginning to identify, according to
research by a French scientist.

Researchers in France and Italy who presented their work at an
international conference in London reported 2 rare strains of bovine
spongiform encephalopathy that are harder to detect and affect mainly
older cattle.

Thierry Baron of the French Food Safety Agency presented research
indicating that a 12-year-old Texas cow testing positive for BSE in
June 2005, and the 10-year-old Alabama cow that tested positive in
March [2006?], showed identical testing patterns to a small number of
BSE cases in France, Sweden and Poland.

Animal scientists are calling such strains "atypical" BSE, which is
different from the "typical" BSE caused by cattle eating feed with
ruminant offal contaminated with a BSE protein.

They don't know whether the atypical strains are caused by something
else or simply appear spontaneously in older, susceptible cattle.

Art Davis, a U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) scientist for the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) at the National
Veterinary Services Laboratory in Ames, Iowa, said in his
presentation Sunday at the London conference that the Texas and
Alabama test results showed completely different prion patterns than
the Washington state case discovered in December 2003.

"The classical lesions were not there," Davis said of the cases. The
Washington state cow originated in Alberta, Canada, near where
several other BSE cases have been found.

The "typical" BSE strain caused a mad cow disease epidemic in Great
Britain beginning in the mid-1980s that killed 184 000 cattle and
more than 100 people who contracted a human form of the disease
caused by eating contaminated beef products.

The scientific evidence shows that in almost all cattle cases, the
fatal neurological disorder was contracted through contaminated meat
and bone meal fed to the cow, typically at a young age.

However, scientists finding atypical cases of BSE are beginning to
question if there has been a change in the abnormal protein that
causes BSE or if cattle might be susceptible to a sporadic BSE
affecting older cattle.

Danny Matthews, head of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies at
England's Veterinary Laboratories Agency, said recent research on
atypical cases of BSE raises questions over whether older cattle can
sporadically get the disease or if there are more strains of BSE than
previously understood. Scientists might also be facing something new,
such as "son of BSE," he said.

"We don't fully understand what atypical BSE means," Matthews said.
"Is it spontaneous or another source causing it? Time will tell."

Although the test patterns in the U.S. cases and atypical cases in
Europe closely matched, Baron said there were no known links among
any of the positive animals. The French Food Safety Agency sent a
researcher to the United States to study the positive Texas case and
compare its results to known cases in France that did not match the
typical BSE positive tests.

"You could place them side-by-side and not tell the difference," Baron said.

Baron also raised the prospect that the disease could be sporadic in
at least a small number of older cattle. He said, however, such a
conclusion would be hard to determine because of the small number of
cattle with this atypical strain globally.

Dr. Sam Holland, South Dakota's state veterinarian, said there are
many strains of BSE and varying degrees of infectiousness of the
agent.

"What if the scenario is there is an atypical prion out there that is
much less infective, has a longer incubation period and has not been
recognized as part of the Great Britain BSE experience identified in
1985 and '86?" Holland said. "There could be others out there that we
haven't recognized yet."

He said it is possible the atypical strains are not caused by
contaminated feed and that it still makes sense to continue the ban
on ruminant offal in cattle feed to prevent the spread of typical BSE
and eventually to eliminate that disease.

"Based on what we know about BSE, it makes good sense to -- number
one -- keep some surveillance in place; number 2, watch what we
import and restrict shipments and movements from places that have had
those syndromes; and, number 3, with what we know about BSE, it seems
to be very prudent to keep our ruminant offal ban in place," Holland
said.

"At least for typical BSE's, it seems to be very effective. It's
probably reasonable to continue the ruminant offal ban even after the
last typical BSE case has been eliminated."

Editor's note: DTN, a private company based in Omaha, Neb., provides
information to agriculture, energy trading markets and other
weather-sensitive industries. The Rapid City Journal received a copy
of DTN's story and expanded on it.

[Byline: Chris Clayton]

--
Terry S. Singletary
and
Mary Marshall

[An atypical form has been found in sheep with scrapie. Other
countries have indicated an atypical form of BSE. It seems logical
that the US would have an a atypical form as well. The case might
even be made that new variant CJD is an atypical form of CJD. Clearly
there is more to the TSE diseases than we fully comprehend. - Mod.TG]

[see also:
2005
----
Scrapie, atypical, ovine - Falkland Islands 20051120.3371
2004
----
Scrapie, atypical, sheep - UK and Ireland 20041210.3274
Scrapie, atypical, sheep - UK (02) 20040409.0965
Scrapie, atypical, sheep - UK20040408.0952
BSE, atypical - France: OIE 20040201.0391
Scrapie, atypical, sheep - France: OIE 20040201.0390
BSE - France: distinct molecular phenotypes 20040107.0076
2003
----
Scrapie - Norway: new phenotype 20031117.2857
BSE - Japan (08): 9th case, lab findings 20031115.2838
BSE, atypical case - Italy: OIE 20031022.2649
BSE - Italy: atypical, suspected 20031012.2576
BSE - Japan (06): atypical 20031009.2547
BSE - Japan (05): atypical 20031008.2526
BSE - Japan (04): atypical 20031007.2511
2002
----
BSE? Sheep - USA (Vermont) 20020412.3937
2000
----
BSE? sheep - USA (Vermont) (06) 20000724.1223
BSE? sheep - USA (Vermont) 20000717.1184
1996
----
CJD sporadic vs variant differences 19960526.0990]
...............tg/pg/lm

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##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

Medical Waste and CJD 2003 guidelines CDC ?
Mon May 1, 2006 16:56
71.248.145.247
Managing Fluid Disposal
Part I of II
By Kathy Dix

Operating room (OR) personnel are frequently overwhelmed by their numerous responsibilities of not only “fixing” the patient, but also preventing infection, maintaining a sterile field, utilizing only sterile instruments, and in general, ensuring the patient’s safety, as well as that of the OR staff. Proper fluid management is one of those crucial steps to preserving the wellbeing of both staff and patient.

Has your OR personnel been trained in the disposal of liquid waste? Are they aware of state and/or city regulations? Is their bloodborne pathogen training recent? Is annual competency testing required?
snip...
Of special interest, APIC’s guidelines also point out the more recent anxiety related to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). “Concerns also have been raised about the need for special handling and treatment procedures for wastes generated during the care of patients with CJD or other transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs),” the guidelines observe. “Prions, the agents that cause TSEs, have significant resistance to inactivation by a variety of physical, chemical, or gaseous methods. No epidemiologic evidence, however, links acquisition of CJD with medical-waste disposal practices. Although handling neurologic tissue for pathologic examination and autopsy materials with care, using barrier precautions, and following specific procedures for the autopsy are prudent measures, employing extraordinary measures once the materials are discarded is unnecessary. Regulated medical wastes generated during the care of the CJD patient can be managed using the same strategies as wastes generated during the care of other patients. After decontamination, these wastes may then be disposed in a sanitary landfill or discharged to the sanitary sewer, as appropriate.”1
http://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/articles/651feat3.html
Guidelines for Environmental Infection Control

in Health-Care Facilities

Recommendations of CDC and the Healthcare Infection Control

Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC)

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

Atlanta, GA 30333

2003
snip...

6. Medical Waste and CJD

Concerns also have been raised about the need for special handling and treatment procedures for wastes

generated during the care of patients with CJD or other transmissible spongiform encephalopathies

(TSEs). Prions, the agents that cause TSEs, have significant resistance to inactivation by a variety of

physical, chemical, or gaseous methods.1427 No epidemiologic evidence, however, links acquisition of

CJD with medical-waste disposal practices. Although handling neurologic tissue for pathologic

examination and autopsy materials with care, using barrier precautions, and following specific

117

procedures for the autopsy are prudent measures,1197 employing extraordinary measures once the

materials are discarded is unnecessary. Regulated medical wastes generated during the care of the CJD

patient can be managed using the same strategies as wastes generated during the care of other patients.

After decontamination, these wastes may then be disposed in a sanitary landfill or discharged to the

sanitary sewer, as appropriate. .........
snip...
http://www.apic.org/AM/Template.cfm?Sectio...ntentFileID=342
VARIANT CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE (vCJD) and BLOOD

COMPONENTS

INFORMATION FOR PATIENTS, February 2006
http://www.hpa.org.uk/infections/topics_az...BC-InfoforP.pdf
http://www.hpa.org.uk/infections/topics_az...ex1-Aug2005.pdf
© 2006 American Society for Investigative Pathology

Detection and Localization of PrPSc in the Skeletal Muscle of Patients with Variant, Iatrogenic, and Sporadic Forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Alexander H. Peden, Diane L. Ritchie, Mark W. Head and James W. Ironside
From the National Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance Unit and Division of Pathology, School of Molecular and Clinical Medicine, University of Edinburgh, Western General Hospital, Edinburgh, United Kingdom
Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) differs from other human prion diseases in that the pathogenic prion protein PrPSc can be detected to a greater extent at extraneuronal sites throughout the body, principally within lymphoid tissues. However, a recent study using a high-sensitivity Western blotting technique revealed low levels of PrPSc in skeletal muscle from a quarter of Swiss patients with sporadic CJD (sCJD). This posed the question of whether PrPSc in muscle could also be detected in vCJD, sCJD, and iatrogenic (iCJD) patients from other populations. Therefore, we have used the same high-sensitivity Western blotting technique, in combination with paraffin-embedded tissue blotting, to screen for PrPSc in muscle tissue specimens taken at autopsy from 49 CJD patients in the United Kingdom. These techniques identified muscle PrPSc in 8 of 17 vCJD, 7 of 26 sCJD, and 2 of 5 iCJD patients. Paraffin-embedded tissue blotting analysis showed PrPSc in skeletal muscle in localized anatomical structures that had the morphological and immunohistochemical characteristics of nerve fibers. The detection of PrPSc in muscle tissue from all forms of CJD indicates the possible presence of infectivity in these tissues, suggesting important implications for assessing the potential risk of iatrogenic spread via contaminated surgical instruments.
http://ajp.amjpathol.org/cgi/content/abstract/168/3/927
SEAC 2006
21. Dr Matthews noted that data are now available on the infectivity of

a wide range of bovine tissues. In September 2005, the World

Health Organisation had updated its assessment of the risk of TSE

infectivity in tissues. These data, although incomplete, should

increase confidence in the safety of particular tissues, particularly if

the age of the source animal is also considered. As a result, less

reliance need now be placed on the status of the country of origin.

Members agreed, but noted that it would be important to assess

the quality of the data on which assessments are based. As it

seems highly likely that blood, at least from humans infected with

vCJD, can be infectious, tissues and organs with a significant

blood supply may also confer higher risk.
http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/draft-91.pdf
THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK FACTORS FOR TSE ARE STILL UNKNOWN, but from recent science coming out lately, the risk factor seems to be increasing, rather than decreasing.
CAN SOMEONE PLEASE EXPLAIN TO ME WHY IT IS STILL ACCEPTABLE FOR sanitary landfill or discharged to the sanitary sewer, as appropriate FOR CJD, when the epidemiology of all phenotypes of sporadic CJDs are not known to date, and with apparent new ones of 'unknown' origin being documented as we speak???

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/resources-casereport.html
THE practice of landfilling and or the discharging to the sanitary sewer, and or spreading to land as fertilizer of any human and or animal TSE should be banned immediately. ...TSS
TSS

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